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Branding India: Constructing a Reputation for Responsibility in the Nuclear Order
Abstract: Nation branding professionals have the same goal as diplomats and politicians — the goal of
endowing the nation with specific qualities in the minds of the target audience, so that it is identified with those
qualities. In other words, both types of professionals are constructing an identity for the country. Insights from the
commercial practice of nation branding can illuminate the process of identity construction by states. As an
illustration, the paper investigates the case of India’s branding/self-presentation as a responsible holder of nuclear
weapons. In 1998, India declared itself a Nuclear Weapon State (NWS). Since India has not been granted NWS status
under the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, this action was considered to be a breach of international norms and
triggered condemnation by several countries. Today, however, India is being incorporated into the governance
mechanisms of the nuclear order, to the extent that it is considered a de facto NWS. The paper identifies four
strategies—differentiation, standardization, total branding, and crisis management—from a review of the nation
branding literature, and relates them to India’s foreign policy strategies in the nuclear issue area in the last two
decades. This paper is an initial attempt to build a bridge between the International Relations and place branding
literatures.

Nation branding is an increasingly professionalized commercial practice that is being adopted by
scores of countries across the globe. Nation branding professionals have the same goal as
diplomats and politicians — the goal of endowing the nation with specific qualities in the minds
of the target audience, so that it is identified with those qualities. In other words, executives in
nation-branding agencies, diplomats, and politicians are all involved in national identity
construction. Those International Relations (IR) theorists who view national identity as a social
construction, can gain insights from studying the commercial practice of nation branding. India’s
branding or self-presentation as a responsible holder of nuclear weapons is used as a case
illustrating the utility of studying nation branding.
This paper has four parts. The first section discusses the concepts of national identity and
branding, and the relationship between them. The second section dissects the concept of the
‘responsible state’ in the international nuclear order. In the third section, the paper shows how
four distinct strategies used in nation/place branding—differentiation, standardization, total
branding, and crisis management—were employed by Indian elites in the last two decades. The

fourth section makes the case for building bridges between the nation branding and IR
literatures.
National identity and nation branding
In the last two decades or so, the discipline of International Relations (IR) has renewed its
interest in ideas, identity, and norms. IR scholars working within the Constructivist perspective
have long insisted that national identity and reputation are not ‘given’ or ‘natural,’ but produced
by strategic actors. As Emanuel Adler puts it, Constructivists are “not interested in how things
are, but in how they became how they are”(Adler 2002). Among IR theories, Constructivism is
the analytical perspective that is best able to explain and critique place branding (Van Ham 2008).
To support this assertion, the paper also provides a brief summary of a competing theory,
Realism.
The processes of national identity construction occur simultaneously at the domestic
(internal) and global (external) level. While these processes occur within the parameters of
existing concepts of national identity, the parameters themselves are subject to change by actors’
aggregated choices. A Constructivist must de-construct, i.e., show the processes that create and
sustain national identity, in order to explain both change and continuity. According to Martha
Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, “Once it was established that norms and social structures matter,
a next obvious step was to investigate how, exactly, they came to matter and how they came to
exist at all” (Finnemore and Sikkink 2001). This is the point at which the nation branding literature
can make a contribution, since it deals specifically with the techniques by which national identity
is produced and presented.
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Constructivists see the identity of a country, when presented to the outside world
through both actions and statements, as a complex creation of political entrepreneurs. These
entrepreneurs include diplomats and other government officials, politicians, media personalities,
and increasingly, practitioners of the sub-field of marketing called ‘place branding’ or more
specifically, ‘nation branding.’
The tasks of promotion, positioning, and reputation management are routine in the world
of commerce. As corporations engaged in these tasks, the techniques of brand management
emerged (Govers 2013). Place branding is a sub-set of brand management, a discipline which
developed out of concrete practices. While marketers are usually selling commercial products
and services, nation branding developed as a response to the conditions of late twentieth century
political economy. Leaders began to conceive of the globalized world as a marketplace in which
their nations compete, and nation branding as a strategy in that competition (Wilder 2007).
Marketers like to emphasize that today’s community of nations resembles a marketplace
because it is open, transparent, and democratic (Anholt and Hildreth 2010). Nation branding is
now a transnational commercial practice that generates billion dollar revenues (Anholt 2005).
Governments are usually motivated by four considerations to invest in nation branding
efforts: attracting foreign investment into the country; boosting exports of goods and services
out of the country; stimulating tourism and in-migration of desirable populations; as well as the
more general objectives of strengthening citizens’ allegiance, and/or securing influence in the
international arena (Dinnie 2007). The paper addresses this last, and most political aspect. That
is, the motivation of the Indian government is not nation branding for its own sake, the goal is to
raise its status in the international system.
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Keith Dinnie defines a nation brand as “the unique, multi-dimensional blend of elements
that provide the nation with culturally grounded differentiation and relevance for all of its target
audiences”(Dinnie 2007). Nation brands can even be ranked. The annual Anholt-GfK Nation
Brands Index ranks fifty countries, with respect to exports, governance, culture, people, tourism
and immigration/investment (GfK 2014). The value of nation brands can be quantified. In 2006,
the Canadian brand was estimated to be worth over a trillion dollars; in other words, it would
cost a trillion dollars to buy the goodwill that people, products, and services enjoy by virtue of
being from Canada (Penner 2006).
Are national identity and the nation brand comparable? Peter van Ham differentiates the
nation from its brand. In his formulation, a brand is a customer's idea about a product; therefore
the nation brand comprises the outside world's ideas about a particular country (van Ham 2001).
For van Ham, the nation-state exists anterior to, and separate from, the way that it is marketed
or branded. Christopher Browning also believes that it is important to distinguish between brand
and identity (Browning 2015). While these conceptual distinctions are important, national
identity construction and the commercial branding of nations/places are similar enough that
scholars can draw parallels.
Interestingly, van Ham does not distinguish between the official formulators of foreign
policy—politicians and diplomats—and marketing professionals. He writes that the logic of
branding applies to all economic and political actors around the world (Van Ham 2008). Others
have also proposed that foreign affairs policy be thought of as a branding exercise (Kavaratzis
2005). In this view, public diplomacy, a subset of diplomatic activity, is another technique of
branding.
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It is important to note that terms such as national image, national identity, or national
reputation, do not provoke the same visceral hostility as ‘brand’ (Aronczyk 2008). Marketing
professional Wally Olins contests Michel Girard’s argument that France "carries a specific dignity
unlike a marketed product." Olins points out that the nation that calls itself France has presented
itself variously as "royalist, republican and imperial," has moved from glorious autocracy, through
the egalitarianism of the Revolution, to the present European state. Thus, at each stage, France
has branded itself differently. Olins blames the rejection of the term ‘brand’ on anti-business
snobbery, the mutual ignorance of business leaders and academics about each other's
professions, and the semantic association of ‘brand’ with triviality and superficiality (Olins 2002).
Products and places do differ in significant ways. A place is already associated with certain
qualities in the mind of the target audience. A place is also less amenable to manipulation by
brand managers, because it has multiple stakeholders rather than a sole legal owner. John and
Nicholas Jackson O’Shaughnessy write: “A nation’s image has too many potential references for
it to be anchored to a hard core of social facts, as is possible in the case of the brand image of a
product” (O'Shaughnessy and O'Shaughnessy 2000). Thus, Melissa Aronczyk refers to nations as
“always already brands” (Aronczyk 2008). It may be unwise to transfer the organization-centric
models of place branding to international politics in an unreflective manner (Rasmussen and
Merkelsen 2014).
Some political scientists find the entire enterprise of nation branding problematic.
Although it is commonly perceived as an apolitical strategy that targets external markets, Somogy
Varga argues that nation-branding is actually a cultural-political measure primarily targeting the
domestic population of the country. Nation branding, in this view, is essentially conservative
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because it brings together neoliberal economic vocabulary and the symbolism of nationalist
discourse to (re)legitimize the nation-state in a globalized world. Varga is also troubled by the
transfer of definitional power to corporate actors from the polity (Varga 2013).
In certain cases, nation branding efforts have reproduced and strengthened ethnic and
religious stereotypes (Wilder 2007). Tourism promotion in newly independent Serbia in the
1990s, focused on Serb and Christian Orthodox culture while excluding minority groups from the
cultural landscape, thus reinforcing the Milosevic regime’s ethnocentric and exclusivist
conception of national identity (Hall 2002). Melissa Aronczyk takes these concerns further,
positing that “nation branding affects the moral basis of national citizenship” (Aronczyk 2008).
The acquisition of nuclear weapons marks a dramatic change in a country’s identity
among other states in the international system. Consequently, its diplomats and others in charge
of properly ‘branding’ the country among the other members of international society must rise
to the challenge and engage in a ‘branding’ (or ‘re-branding’). This task is rendered even more
critical because, in the current global order, a country that is seen as an ‘irresponsible’ or
‘illegitimate’ possessor of nuclear weapons, it may face stringent sanctions—even including
invasion. Nuclearization is indeed a substantial motivation for nation-branding. As the following
section shows, acquisition of the identity of a ‘responsible state’ is the goal.
Nuclear weapons and the concept of responsibility
India has successfully sought to be branded as a responsible state. Since the term
‘responsible’ is in common usage as a desired identity, the analysis focuses on the branding of
countries as responsible. What exactly does the term mean in the contemporary nuclear order?
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To be ‘responsible’ for something could mean that one is assigned blame for misconduct.
Alternatively, when a person is responsible, we say that she is behaving in a manner that avoids
misconduct. The theorist Toni Erskine terms these “retrospective” and “prospective”
understandings of the concept of responsibility. In these terms, in the last decade India moved
from a retrospective attribution of responsibility as culpability, to a prospective attribution of
responsibility as role-appropriate behaviour (Erskine 2003).
On testing nuclear weapons in 1998, India was held responsible for breaking the norm
that forbade the testing of nuclear devices, for triggering proliferation in its region, and for
destabilizing international security. Starting around 2005, however, India is increasingly seen as
a responsible state whose nuclear weapons should be accepted in the interests of global stability.
This is dramatically demonstrated by two statements by US Presidents. In 1998, President Bill
Clinton said that India was “on the wrong side of history”(Clinton 1998). Only seven years later,
President George W. Bush declared in a joint statement with Indian Prime Minister Manmohan
Singh: “as a responsible state with advanced nuclear technology, India should acquire the same
benefits and advantages as other such states” (emphasis mine) (Office of the Press Secretary
2005).
In the current global nuclear order, responsible behaviour is equated with two factors.
First, a responsible state accepts the doctrine of deterrence which restricts the role of nuclear
weapons to a last-resort threat. Unlike conventional weapons, nuclear weapons must not be
used for coercion, nor against challenges that fall short of threatening the state’s existence. One
could argue that there is nothing responsible about holding entire populations hostage to the
threat of nuclear annihilation, but the practice of deterrence was even recognized by the
7

International Court of Justice as a justification for certain states retaining nuclear arsenals.
Constructivists recognize that the equation of deterrence with stability has become a global norm
(Farrell and Lambert 2001). Second, a responsible state restricts the diffusion of nuclear
technology, so that nuclear materials and know-how are out of reach of other states (and more
importantly, non-state actors or terrorist groups).
The 1968 Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) institutionalizes the divisions of
responsibility. The five states that had tested nuclear weapons before 1967 are designated in the
treaty as Nuclear Weapon States (NWS), and are granted the right—now in perpetuity—to
possess nuclear weapons. The NWS have the responsibility to refrain from transferring nuclear
technology to other states, except under multilateral safeguards that ensure peaceful, civilian
use. They must also negotiate nuclear disarmament in good faith. These five NWS are the United
States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, and China. All other states are considered NonNuclear Weapon States (NNWS), obliged to eschew development of nuclear technology, except
under multilateral safeguards. India, Pakistan, and Israel are the only states that have never
signed the NPT (North Korea is the only state to sign, and then exit the treaty).
India was not the first country to attempt the ‘responsible state’ branding. China has,
through participation in, and compliance with, the institutions of the nuclear order been
accepted as a responsible stakeholder (Zoellick 2005). China’s accession to the NPT in 1992 is
symbolic of its entry into the global mainstream. It is no coincidence that the accession occurred
at the end of the Cold War, an era that reinforced the perception of NWS as mature and advanced
states, responsible for global stability through their deft wielding of the instruments of
deterrence. The spread of nuclear weapons, rather than vertical growth or qualitative
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improvements in existing NWS arsenals, became the pre-eminent threat. As Richard Price puts
it, the international community seemed to have come to the conclusion that nuclear weapons
don’t kill people, rogue states do (Price 2007).
India had occupied a hybrid position in the regime for four decades, in between the
categories of NWS and NNWS. Although it had tested a nuclear device in 1974, India denied that
it had a weapons program. As the post-Cold War non-proliferation regime tightened its scrutiny
of violators, India had to differentiate itself from countries such as North Korea or Iraq—other
possessors of nuclear capabilities that were not recognized by the NPT. It was mainly in order to
resolve this bind that India conducted a series of nuclear tests in May 1998. It is important to
note that the government in New Delhi named these tests as nuclear weapon tests, accompanied
by a declaration that India was now a NWS (Vajpayee 1998).
While world opinion initially criticized India’s decision, India became gradually accepted
into the nuclear order, as illustrated by the presidential statements reported above. Some
indicators of this acceptance are the nuclear cooperation agreements between India and several
important countries including Australia, Canada, France, Japan, and Russia, in addition to the
United States (Press Information Bureau 2015); India’s participation in deliberations on
enhancing global nuclear security (Sirohi 2016); and the potential entry of the country into the
Nuclear Suppliers Group—a body that was set up to tighten export controls in response to an
Indian test in the 1970s (Williams 2016).
Realist scholars of International Relations claim that the acceptance of India is a response
to its rising power in Asia, and its potential use as a counter-balance to China in that region
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(Ganguly 2005, Pant 2011). Thus, these scholars assert that the nation branding was next to
irrelevant because balance of power considerations forced the United States to befriend India;
and other nations fell in line behind the Americans.
A different structural argument, based on international economic relations, proposes that
the driving force was the economic imperative of global corporations (Ghoshroy 2010). Jarrod
Hayes puts forward a Constructivist argument that India’s democratic form of government made
it possible for the United States government to de-securitize its nuclear program, and present it
to American and international stakeholders as legitimate (Hayes 2015).
The argument presented here posits that India’s reputation as a responsible power was a
necessary foundation for its acceptance into the nuclear club, whether that acceptance was
motivated by balance-of-power considerations, commercial interests, or democratic
commonalities. While not disputing the Realist, economic, or Constructivist accounts existing in
the literature, this paper asks how India laid this foundation through nation branding.
Nation branding techniques and India
How did Indian diplomats and other leaders go about branding India in the nuclear arena? While
several techniques were used in this broad effort, four techniques are especially interesting since
they are regularly used in nation branding for commercial purposes. This section discusses these
techniques—differentiation, standardization, total branding, and crisis management—practiced
by agents of the Indian government. These techniques were identified through a review of the
nation branding literature, in articles and books that were written by theorists and practitioners
dealing with other cases. This section provides examples of each technique from India’s post10

nuclear test activity. While the Indian government did not retain a firm of nation branding experts
to focus on nuclear diplomacy, its identity construction efforts mirror the strategies used by
nation branding professionals.1
Differentiation
The first imperative in nation branding is for the country to distinguish itself from its
counterparts, so that it may emerge from a cluttered and competitive environment (Aronczyk
2008). Knowing the areas in which a nation has reputational capital is analogous to a company
knowing its core competencies (O'Shaughnessy and O'Shaughnessy 2000). Simon Anholt suggests
that a country enhance its brand identity with “more relevant and distinctive qualities,” so as to
be chosen over its competitors (Anholt 2007). In product branding, this outcome is often
achieved by presenting a direct contrast with an inferior product. India differentiated itself from
other poor and unstable developing countries by highlighting the incentives and imperatives of
economic growth, and from China and Pakistan by emphasizing good governance.
India’s economy grew 7.6% percent annually in the decade starting 2000-01 (Dreze and
Sen 2013). Coupled with its large population, this created a large market for foreign companies.
Specifically on the nuclear issue, the government opened up the civil nuclear energy sector, on
the grounds that it was a sustainable way to satisfy rising energy demands. The Indian Atomic
Energy Commission announced the goal of increasing installed reactor capacity more than sevenfold to 35000 MWe by the year 2022 and to 60000 MWe by 2032. India became an attractive
market for vendors of reactors, fuel, and allied services. The United States-India Business Council
1

The Indian government did launch a branding campaign focused on attracting tourists (and generally boosting the
country’s image) in 2002. The motto of the campaign was “Incredible India.”
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estimated India would spend $175 million over 30 years on nuclear energy (Pant 2011). Supplier
countries realized that the opportunity costs of export bans on nuclear technology were rising.
The Indian government’s championing of nuclear energy as a solution to economic and
environmental problems had yet another effect. By emphasizing its real growth-driven ‘need’ for
nuclear energy, India distinguished itself from countries that might obtain nuclear technology as
a cover for eventual weapons manufacture.
Although two of the five NWS—Russia and China—were dictatorships when they acquired
nuclear weapons (and are far from democratic today), democracy and good governance have
turned out to be increasingly important in evaluating whether a country’s nuclear program seems
threatening to global stability (Hayes 2009). The fact that India was a democracy was therefore a
crucial resource in constructing a responsible identity. This was especially true during the George
W. Bush administration. India could not “be ignored when democracy promotion was at the heart
of the American foreign policy” (Pant 2011).
India sought to demonstrate good governance in four areas relevant to the nuclear
issue—civilian oversight of the nuclear program, separation of civilian and military activities, and
secure guardianship of nuclear materials. The origins of the Indian nuclear program and its nearly
five decade-long undeclared status favoured purely civilian direction. Even after the formal
declaration in 1998, the government remains reluctant to delegate authority over nuclear
weapons to the military (Narang 2014). In discussions with their foreign counterparts, Indian
leaders asserted that civilian control meant that material would be safe (Suryanarayana 2007,
Chandrasekar and Krishna 2010).
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The dominance of the military in the Pakistani polity, especially on security and nuclear
issues, is a concern for the international community (Kampani 2001, Hersh 2009). Pakistan stands
in as an effective contrast (essentially portrayed by India as the ‘evil twin’) in light of the
revelations about the involvement of some parts of its government—the so-called A.Q. Khan
network—in the nuclear black market. India also sought to present itself as a victim of
proliferation from China to Pakistan. Senior Indian negotiator Shyam Saran said in 2005: “As a
responsible nuclear weapon state, we are even more conscious of our obligations to the
international community on the control of WMD technologies and their delivery systems.” Saran
went on to draw an explicit contrast to the cooperation between China and Pakistan that may
violate international norms (Saran 2005). In 2003, the Indian Foreign Minister said in Parliament
that if the criteria for pre-emptive invasion were the possession of Weapons of Mass Destruction,
the absence of democracy, and export of terrorism, then no country deserves more than Pakistan
to be tackled. He declared that India had a better case for initiating pre-emptive action against
Pakistan, than the US had against Iraq (Anon 2003). He proposed that Pakistan be included in the
‘axis of evil’ (Suroor 2002).
India has also expressed concern about the inability of the Pakistani state to control
militant groups that operate within its territory, and the troubling implications for the safety of
nuclear materials and technology (Anon 2006, Singh 2009). Every time India expresses concern
about proliferation from Pakistan, it is reinforcing the idea that “proliferation” amounts to buying
or stealing materials and technology as opposed to manufacturing bombs for oneself, thereby
exempting itself from the category of proliferator.
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India played up the fact that although it is neither a member of supplier groups nor the
NPT, its record is better than China’s. A spokesman for the Indian Prime Minister asserted: “We
have a track record like that of a signatory to the NPT, and certainly we are better than China we have a much better record of non-proliferation”(Anon 2006).
Standardization
In branding, the strategy of differentiation must be balanced with the need to remain
rooted in a relational context of functional similarity or standardization (Aronczyk 2008). That is,
the product or nation must be placed in an echelon with other, similarly well-regarded products
or nations. Highly unique brands may not draw recognition from diverse audiences (Ooi 2014).
Research has shown that people are “sloppy cognitive processors.” They resist changing their
cognitive structures and prefer to adjust what they see to fit what they know. Therefore,
marketers try to manage and influence the images in the minds of decision-makers regarding
particular countries (Kotler and Gertner 2010).
The formal and enthusiastic adoption of the doctrine of deterrence was key in India’s rebranding as, and desired identification with, the NWS. With this adoption, India showed itself to
be similar to the five NWS, in that its weapons were officially acknowledged, and designated as
deterrents.
Colin Gray once said that just as everyone supports peace, everybody is for deterrence
(Williams 1992). This does not hold true in the Indian case. Indians in the 1950s opposed the very
concept of deterrence, on the grounds that it relies on the conditional use of nuclear weapons
(Menon 2000). The dean of Indian strategists, K. Subrahmanyam, denounced the idea of
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deterrence as both immoral and unworkable (Subrahmanyam 1981). As late as 1995, an Indian
Prime Minister told the United Nations General Assembly that deterrence was a “false
belief”(Rao 1995).
While formally denouncing the doctrine, India tried to play the game of deterrence.
Statements were issued from time to time that hinted at nuclear weapons capability as well as
intention to use it. In 1974, India’s designation of its first nuclear test as a ‘peaceful nuclear
explosion’ avoided a direct confrontation with the nascent NPT regime. Although New Delhi
claimed that the test had no military implications, India obtained some of the benefits of nuclear
deterrence, in part because a device test, thanks to the NPT, had become the marker of nuclear
weapons capability.
The 1998 tests were perceived as signalling a shift in Indian strategic culture toward
defiance of the international community. The branding of the tests tells a different story.
Statements in May 1998 were carefully calibrated to defend the now-official capability, while
emphasizing to the international community that the country aspired to be a pillar of the nuclear
order. The doctrinal package that enveloped the tests was intended to send out both a clear(er)
threat and a reassurance that India did not intend to use its newly-acquired capability for
aggression or revisionism.
In a ‘leaked’ letter to President Clinton, the Indian Prime Minister justified the tests as a
response to the “overt nuclear weapon state on our borders, a state which committed armed
aggression against India in 1962…that country has materially helped another neighbour of ours
to become a covert nuclear weapons state” (Vajpayee 1998). The reference is to the People’s
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Republic of China. First, this statement asserts that India, just like other NWS, is entitled to
nuclear weapons because of ‘genuine’ security reasons. Second, by naming China as the threat
stimulus, India seeks to make common cause with the United States.
In the nation branding literature, this is known as an “accreditation” strategy. It adds
credibility to the brand and imbues it with globally understood references. This is akin to a city
that attracts globally recognized brands or businesses, which end up vouching for its excellence.
An example might be Abu Dhabi investing in a Guggenheim Museum (Ooi 2014).
Total branding
Brand managers are cognizant of the need for the integration of communications in place
branding. Philip Kotler and his co-authors write that “place promotion has the best chance for
success when the message is matched to the media, all the players are pushing in the same
direction, and informal impressions reinforce the paid efforts”(Kotler, Haider et al. 1993). For
instance, the image of a site as ‘natural’ and ‘eco-friendly’ would be marred by large
manufacturing facilities; if the place is branded as ‘friendly,’ street protests must be controlled
by the authorities. The communications and marketing strategies that underpin the brand are
often referred to as “hymn sheets” or “song sheets,” which are intended to harmonize and unify
the communications for the nation brand (Aronczyk 2008).
In the Indian context, leaders realized the importance of staying on message—the
message being that the nuclear arsenal is solely a response to an external and existential security
threat. After the 1998 tests, the more radical and overtly religious factions of the ruling Hindu
nationalist group were tightly leashed. The Prime Minister vetoed all official celebrations by his
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political party, and refused permission for the construction of a temple at the test site. The
government was cautioned not to let the tests get hijacked by the “lunatic fringe” (George 1998,
Misra 1998, Singh 1998). One of India’s foremost commenters on nuclear affairs, C. Raja Mohan,
urged the Prime Minister “to signal to the world that India is determined to become a responsible
nuclear weapon power. A series of provocative statements at various levels in the Government
and the ruling party have spread confusion, intensified the mistrust in the region and generated
concern worldwide that New Delhi has drifted into a dangerous game of nuclear sabrerattling”(Raja Mohan 1998).
Another element of total branding was the image of India as a modern, technologicallycapable state. The first paragraph of the statement on the implementation of the 2005 India-US
civil nuclear cooperation agreement firmly situates it in that context: “The resumption of full
civilian nuclear energy cooperation between India and the United States arose in the context of
India’s requirement for adequate and affordable energy supplies to sustain its accelerating
economic growth rate and as recognition of its growing technological prowess” (Anon 2008).
Proposals for cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear technology by Indian leaders make sure
to reference India’s achievements in other areas of science and technology (Anon 2005, Singh,
Bagla et al. 2012).
Crisis management
Despite the best efforts of consultants and politicians, crises do occur. Some nation
branding professionals specialize in the management of reputations during and after crises. I.I.
Mitroff and C.M. Pearson set out the following steps for crisis management: signal detection
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(separating the ‘signal’ from the noise of constant events), prevention and preparation,
containment and damage limitation, recovery, and learning (Avraham and Ketter 2008). These
steps can be observed in India’s responses to two crises with Pakistan that erupted following the
formal declaration of nuclear status: the 1999 Kargil conflict, and the 2001-02 border standoff.
India had to draw the line between legitimate self-defence (the ‘signal’) and nucleararmed coercion. While public opinion in India in 1999 supported crossing the Line of Control with
Pakistan in ‘hot pursuit’ of the infiltrators, and carrying out strikes on terrorist camps, the
government eschewed these options. This was especially noteworthy considering that it was a
weak government facing national elections. This restraint, in contrast with Pakistan’s inability or
unwillingness to control the infiltrators, was parlayed into diplomatic gains. India’s National
Security Adviser Brajesh Mishra said at the time: “The recent operations in Kargil have
demonstrated that our system and the political leadership believe in great responsibility and
restraint, as you would expect from the largest democracy in the world”(Sidhu 2000).
Containment and damage limitation were seen in the second crisis, which was triggered
by an attempt to storm the Indian Parliament in December 2001. The Indian government
demanded the extradition of several operatives allegedly residing in Pakistan. The demand was
backed up with the mobilization of 800,000 Indian troops, facing off at the border with Pakistani
soldiers. Although it issued nuclear threats, the Indian government did exercise restraint, drew
attention to that restraint, and attributed the restraint to deterrence. The former President of
India and the ex-Chief of Army Staff are among the top leaders giving nuclear deterrence the
credit for the avoidance of war in these crises (Sidhu 2007, Anon 2009).
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Finally, we see evidence of learning about the importance of integrating security decisionmaking with maintaining the desired identity among global partners. In April 2004 a new army
doctrine called ‘Cold Start’ was announced. It envisages that Integrated Battle Groups of division
size would arrive speedily at the border, poised to make shallow territorial gains in Pakistan, if so
directed. When the crisis ends, these pockets of occupied territory could be used by India as
bargaining chips (Ladwig III 2007/ 08). Understanding the inevitability of quick intervention by
the international community, leaders in New Delhi crafted a doctrine allowing India to show
restraint—by eschewing large deployments—while threatening Pakistan with retaliation.
Insights from nation branding techniques
This section addresses the value added of studying nation branding to IR theorists
interested in ideational factors, and also suggests that nation branding gurus could benefit from
attention to a specific theoretical issue that is addressed by IR theorists. There are two benefits
to IR theorists of studying nation branding: first, identifying techniques from nation branding in
diplomatic practice helps reveal processes in national identity construction; second,
understanding how brand identity works strengthens theorists’ arguments that even a
‘constructed’ national identity is powerful. A third lesson that can be drawn from bringing these
two literatures together is a contribution from IR theory to nation branding: recognizing the
distinction between the social and corporate identities of a nation-state.
Constructivism treats identity as an empirical question to be theorized within a historical
context, that is, as a dependent variable rather than a given. A core Constructivist claim is that
agents (states/other actors) and structures (the international system) are mutually determined

19

or co-constituted. It is, therefore, incumbent on Constructivists to deconstruct national identities
and reveal the power struggles that went into the process. Yet, Constructivists have “much more
work to do in sorting out the dynamics of constitutive processes”(Klotz and Lynch 2007).
Constructivists have also been criticized for neglecting the agency of domestic actors in selfpresentation and norm construction (Checkel 1999, Hopf 2000).
Some processes of national identity construction can be revealed by understanding the
techniques of nation branding, and identifying them in diplomatic practices. The first sub-section
shows how India differentiated itself from unstable or rogue states by emphasizing growth and
governance. In the sub-section on standardization, we note how international norms constituted
this desired identity and pushed the Indian government to explicitly avow deterrence. In the subsection on total branding, we see that India suppressed some voices in order to construct its
desired identity. India’s options in crisis management were restricted by its need to preserve its
reputation for responsible behaviour.
Constructivists have also struggled with the question of whether we can attribute
autonomous power to a constructed identity. While they agree that identities are inherently
contestable, they argue over whether/when to treat them as relatively fixed (Klotz and Lynch
2007). Marketing professionals recognize that the brand only exists in the minds of potential
consumers. It is a distributed identity that is manipulable, within limits, by skilful marketing
management. Nation branding consultants may even claim that branding can render actual
product attributes irrelevant (Volcic and Andrejevic 2011). Simon Anholt compares a brand to
the children’s game of joining up the dots to create the outline of an animal. Just as the dots must
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be numbered for the game to work, positive associations must be kept fresh in the mind of the
consumer (Anholt 2005).
One of the best-known definitions of a brand terms it “a singular idea or concept that you
own inside the mind of a prospect”(Ries and Ries 1998). In so far as nations are also concepts,
they are unlikely to be exceptions to the manipulations of concepts. As Peter van Ham asks: “Why
should we assume that the public readily buys into the seductive meanings of consumer
capitalism but remains rational and objective when making political decisions?”(van Ham 2001).
Just as the average consumer has neither resources nor inclination to investigate the
claims of each product’s advertisements, most countries interacting with India will be influenced
by its brand image in the global political context. Some authors have claimed that nation branding
is more salient in global economic relations than in the security sphere. According to Christopher
Browning, branding processes presume a downplaying of security in favour of economics
(Browning 2015). The analysis above shows that even on the nuclear weapons issue, where one
expects that security imperatives will be fundamental, image matters. Consumers care deeply
about certain purchases, and may investigate marketers’ claims, yet take mental short cuts in
other cases. The Indian brand image comes into play in interactions with the majority of India’s
potential partners, who do not perceive it as threatening. We would expect Pakistan to be less
susceptible to Indian branding efforts.
Paying attention to nation branding practices helps IR scholars understand the power of
branding/reputation/image; the default mode is to accept the dominant brand image. Thus,

21

while applying concepts from nation branding helps illuminate processes of national identity
construction, it also enables us to account for the power of a constructed national identity.
International Relations has rarely borrowed concepts from the management sciences,
except in the literature on institutionalism. Nation branding is no exception. Jelena Subotic and
Ayse Zarakol write, “While even a cursory glance makes it clear that “nation branding” projects
should be of interest to scholars of International Relations, our discipline remains relatively
disengaged from the analysis of this growing trend” (Subotic and Zarakol 2014).
At the same time, management scholars have disregarded theories of national identity,
thereby falling into conceptual dilemmas. IR theorists are attentive to the distinction between
nation-as-state and nation-as-people (Barkin and Cronin 1994). When management scholars
ignore this distinction, they become confused and frustrated regarding the role of people/citizens
in nation branding (Aronczyk 2008).
The distinction that IR theorist Alexander Wendt makes between the country’s social
identity and its corporate identity can be helpful here. ‘Social’ identity is the country’s identity in
relation to its peers, or to put it differently, the face it shows in international society. ‘Corporate’
identity refers to the glue that holds the country together (Wendt 1999). Paul Kowert posits a
similar distinction between “internal” identity which refers to the cohesion of the nation-state’s
parts, and “external” identity, which refers to its distinctiveness (Kowert 1999). Nation branding
is primarily concerned with social identity. Nation branding professionals are enthusiastic about
leveraging national character and culture in order to enhance a positive ‘country-of-origin’ effect,
for instance, by emphasizing a British sense of decorum or Japanese perfectionism. Yet there are
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cases when corporate identity depends on practices of “cultural intimacy”—practices that make
for a collective identity, which may transgress the dominant norms of international society
(Subotic and Zarakol 2012). If there is a fundamental incompatibility between the desired social
identity and the existing corporate identity, nation branding strategies would be ineffective
because citizens’ behaviour would not accord with the nation brand. Nation branding
professionals would benefit from recognizing this distinction. In the case discussed here, choices
of ordinary citizens mattered only marginally because the issue-area of nuclear policy is
extremely elite-centric, although evidence is presented of domestic actors being restrained in
order to maintain the integrity of the brand.
Conclusion
International Relations (IR) scholars are increasingly interested in identity and reputation.
Professional marketers engage in branding and selling nations. This paper is an initial attempt to
build a bridge between the IR and place branding literatures, and uses a specific example as proof
of its utility.
Using the example of India’s brand identity in the nuclear order, this work makes a case
that the two disciplines can learn from each other. While a nation-state differs in important ways
from a consumer product, the techniques that are used to create images in the minds of the
target audience have interesting parallels. For Constructivist IR scholars in particular, a
knowledge of nation branding techniques, and an effort to identify them in foreign policy actions
and statements, can help illuminate the process by which leaders construct a social identity for
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their country in the international arena, and also strengthen their argument that the identity so
constructed, has autonomous power.
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